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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the potential for increased 
cross-border labour mobility within the EU-25 
and considers the costs and benefits of any 
increase in labour mobility to both sending and 
receiving countries in the medium to long run. 
Evidence from previous EU enlargement 
experiences, academic studies, the existence of 
barriers to mobility within the EU and the 
economic determinants of migration all indicate 
a moderate potential for increased migrant 
flows. The magnitude of cross-border labour 
flow in the medium to long run will most likely 
be largely a function of the demand for migrants 
and the speed at which the EU-8 catches up 
economically with the EU-15. If broad-based 
economic growth and social development 
continues in the EU-8, labour migration will 
most likely decrease. In addition, faster 
population ageing in the EU-8 tends towards 
dampening migration flow from the new 
Member States in the medium term. 
In terms of costs and benefits, for the EU-8 
countries labour migration, especially in the 
short run, may present a number of challenges. 
Emigration may tend to weigh disproportionally 
on the pool of young and educated workers, 
aggravating labour market bottlenecks in a 
number of EU-8 countries. For the EU-25 as a 
whole, cross-border labour mobility is likely to 
offer a number of advantages, by allowing a 
more efficient matching of workers‘ skills with 
job vacancies and facilitating the general up-
skilling of European workforces. The current 
restrictions on labour mobility from the EU-8 
countries to the other EU member countries 
stand in contrast with one of the central 
principles of the EU – the free movement of 
labour. Furthermore, these restrictions may 
decrease the efficient use of labour resources in 
the face of demographic change and globalisation 
and hamper an important adjustment mechanism 
within EMU. Delaying the removal of these 
barriers may be costly for the EU-25 at a time 
when leaders are concerned about Europe‘s 
international competitiveness and may increase 
illegal work in a number of countries. Finally, 
it would not be beneficial for Europe to loose a 
significant part of the most agile and talented 
individuals from the new Member States to 
more traditional migration centres such as the 
US and Canada.5
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This Occasional Paper considers the potential 
for increased cross-border labour mobility 
within an enlarged EU in the medium to long 
run and the costs and benefits of any increase 
in labour mobility to both sending and receiving 
countries. 
The first part of the Paper assesses the potential 
for an increase in international labour mobility 
within the EU following the 2004 EU 
enlargement. On balance, this analysis suggests 
that the large-scale migration of workers will 
be an unlikely outcome of a full liberalisation 
of labour flows between the EU-15 and EU-81, 
particularly in the medium to long run. 
Nevertheless, an increase in cross-border labour 
flows is to be expected and should be welcomed 
to the extent that it promotes a more efficient 
allocation of workers in the EU’s single market 
and within the euro area. A situation where the 
labour force of any new euro area Member State 
faces constraints on its mobility to other euro 
area Member States would not be optimal. 
Separate sections of the Paper consider: 
(1) Labour flows following the earlier EU 
accessions of Greece, Spain and Portugal, 
which suggest that the increase in geographical 
labour mobility following these enlargements 
was limited. (2) Previous studies of the potential 
migrant flow from East to West Europe, which 
indicate a moderate potential flow of between 
1-4% of the total population of the EU-10 – i.e. 
between 1 and 3 million people within one to 
two decades after the EU-wide freedom of 
movement is granted to citizens of all EU-10 
countries (for comparison, total net migration 
to the EU-15 from the rest of the world was 
estimated at around 1.75 million people in 2003 
alone2). (3) The frequently cited barriers to 
labour mobility within the EU-153, which are 
unlikely to be any lower between the EU-10 and 
the EU-15 Member States, and also suggest that 
a large increase in international labour mobility 
is unlikely. Furthermore, transitional legal 
restrictions on geographical labour mobility 
between the EU-8 (Malta and Cyprus are 
excluded from these restrictions) and the 
EU-15 have been agreed under the 2003 
accession arrangements. (4) The economic 
determinants of migration. This analysis shows 
that wage and income differentials between the 
EU-10 and EU-15 exist and that the size of 
these differentials relative to the costs of 
migration may be an important determinant 
promoting labour flows in the short run. 
Experiences may not be uniform across EU 
countries, with some countries more likely to 
host immigrant workers (e.g. due to network 
effects and geographical location) and other 
countries more likely to be the source countries 
of migrant workers (e.g. due to high youth 
unemployment rates). In the medium to long 
term, the extent of cross-border labour flow 
will depend on the demand for migrants and the 
speed at which the EU-8 catch up with the EU-
15, the expectations of the EU-8 citizens about 
economic and social developments within their 
own countries, the movement of capital, and the 
extent of trade in goods and services. If broad-
based economic growth and social development 
continues in the EU-8, labour migration 
pressures should diminish even without a full 
convergence of wages. In addition, faster 
population ageing in the EU-8 than in the EU-
15 is also likely to curb the migration of workers 
from the new EU Member States in the medium 
run. Moreover, against the background of strong 
growth and adverse demographic developments, 
most EU-8 countries are likely to become net 
migration-receiving countries themselves in the 
medium run.
1   The following definitions apply: The EU-15 refers to Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. EU-10 includes the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. EU-8 refers to the EU-10, 
excluding Malta and Cyprus.
2   European Commission (2006), “Labour migration patterns in 
Europe: recent trends, future challenges”.
3   Including legal and administrative barriers; the lack of 
familiarity with other European languages and cultures; the 
monetary costs of moving; inefficient housing markets; the 
limited portability of pension rights; the lack of clarity in the 
international recognition of professional qualifications; and 
non-formal learning and the lack of transparency of job 
openings.6
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The Paper then moves on to present evidence 
since the 2004 EU enlargement. This section 
shows that the early experiences since 
enlargement are generally positive. Preliminary 
evidence from the European Commission shows 
that since enlargement, the increase in the stock 
of EU-10 workers in the EU-15 Member States 
has been low. Labour immigration from non-
EU countries is generally a much more 
significant phenomenon than intra-EU labour 
mobility, both within the EU-15 and the EU-25. 
Most migration of workers is found to be of a 
temporary nature, with a significant percentage 
of work permits being granted for short-term or 
seasonal workers. Furthermore, both the sector 
and the skill composition of the EU-10 citizens 
resident in EU-15 countries suggest that 
migrants from the EU-10 tend to play a 
complementary role in EU-15 labour markets. 
Fears concerning the overuse of social security 
systems by migrants have not been realised. 
Generally, migrants from EU-10 countries are 
found to have employment rates which are 
comparable or higher than EU-15 country 
nationals and that the employment rate of 
EU-10 nationals has actually increased since 
the 2004 enlargement in several countries (e.g. 
Spain, France, the Netherlands, Austria and the 
United Kingdom). Data from the national 
statistical offices of individual EU countries 
also generally show a moderate increase in 
labour migration from the EU-10. The countries 
that removed restrictions on the mobility of 
EU-10 workers first, in 2004 (i.e. the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden), have in general 
favourable experiences about the labour market 
impact of migration from these countries. 
The final section of this Paper considers the 
economic costs and benefits of increased cross-
border labour mobility to both sending and 
receiving countries. The public’s resistance to 
labour migration in a number of countries is 
based on concerns that migrants may drive 
down wages, take away jobs from the native 
population and place a strain on the social 
security systems of these countries. Our survey 
of the empirical literature finds limited evidence 
in support of these concerns and suggests that, 
on balance, for the host countries (the EU-15), 
the economic impacts of increased cross-border 
labour mobility are likely to be positive, 
although potentially unequally distributed 
across countries. Countries closest to the EU-8, 
and those with a significant migrant population 
from the EU-8, are likely to benefit 
disproportionately from East-West labour 
mobility following the opening of their labour 
markets. However, this does not exclude the 
possibility of localised difficulties (e.g. in 
border regions with intensive commuting). 
For the EU-8 countries, labour migration, 
especially in the short run, may present a 
number of challenges as well as benefits. While 
labour migration flows from the EU-8 are likely 
to be minor compared to the population of the 
EU-15, they can weigh far heavier on the pool 
of young and educated workers in the EU-8. 
Labour shortages (e.g. in medical personal) are 
already causing concerns in a number of EU-8 
countries. The balance of positive and negative 
effects of increased cross-border mobility 
mainly depends on whether labour migration is 
primarily temporary or permanent. Returning 
migrants may give a boost to economic growth 
by bringing in capital, skills and new ideas 
acquired abroad, which may offset the initial 
losses caused by brain drain. Increased labour 
migration is also most likely beneficial for the 
migrants themselves who may enjoy higher 
incomes.
For the EU as a whole, cross-border labour 
mobility is likely to offer a number of advantages 
by allowing a more efficient matching of worker 
skills with job vacancies and facilitating the 
general up-skilling of European workforces. It 
may also offer an important adjustment 
mechanism within EMU, where in the absence 
of country-specific monetary and exchange rate 
policies, labour market mobility would be 
beneficial in promoting the ability of national 
labour markets to adjust in the face of economic 
fluctuations and asymmetric shocks. The euro 
area will enlarge on 1 January 2007 with the 
entry of Slovenia. In order to fully reap the 
advantages of the euro and to allow adjustment 7
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mechanisms to operate efficiently within the 
enlarged currency area, it will be necessary to 
fully integrate Slovenia into Economic and 
Monetary Union, which calls for all remaining 
barriers to labour mobility to be removed4.
The restrictions on labour mobility from the 
EU-8 countries will be temporary, as they will 
have to be removed by 2011 at the latest. 
However the delay may be costly for the EU-25, 
limiting the most productive use of labour 
resources at a time when EU populations are 
ageing and leaders are concerned about Europe’s 
international competitiveness. Furthermore, the 
temporary restrictions on cross-border mobility 
stand in contrast with one of the central 
principles of the EU – the free movement of 
labour. Today’s East-West labour migration 
flows include a large number of temporary 
workers, some of whom work illegally. Such 
employment relationships deprive immigrants 
from the protection of employment laws and 
prevent the host country from collecting tax 
revenues. Finally, it would not be desirable for 
the EU-25 if a significant part of the most agile 
and talented individuals from the new Member 
States are diverted to traditional migration 
centres (e.g. United States, Canada) instead of 
taking on employment in other EU Member 
States. 
1 INTRODUCTION
In a flexible labour market, a high degree of 
labour mobility is desirable to help employment 
adjust favourably to changing demand 
conditions. An inefficient allocation of labour 
resources may negatively affect the longer-term 
level and growth rate of potential output and, 
in the short run, limits the pace at which 
an economy can grow. Therefore, the free 
movement of labour constitutes one of the 
central principles of the EU and is an important 
component of the completion of the single 
market. 
Detailed and comparable data on the cross-
border flow of labour is generally difficult to 
obtain for the EU Member States. Available 
evidence for the EU-155 suggests that, overall, 
cross-border labour mobility is low. In 2000, 
only 0.1% of the total EU-15 population (or 
225,000 people) changed official residence 
between two member countries (European 
Commission 20026). Furthermore, at 0.4% of 
the EU-15 population, only a small proportion 
of individuals are known to commute across 
borders to work and half of this amount is to a 
non EU-15 country. In contrast, in the United 
States, geographical labour mobility is 
considered to be far higher. Evidence suggests 
that around 5.9% of the total US population 
changed residence between US counties in 1999 
(European Commission 2002).
The low level of cross-border labour mobility 
across the EU-15 exists despite the legal 
provision for the free movement of labour. 
Reasons cited for this include the existence of 
legal and administrative barriers, the lack of 
familiarity with other European languages, 
moving costs, inefficient housing markets, the 
limited portability of pension rights, problems 
with the international recognition of professional 
qualifications and the lack of transparency of 
job openings. Nevertheless, policy-makers have 
generally recognised the benefits of increased 
cross-border labour mobility within Europe, 
both to individuals (in the form of offering new 
opportunities and perhaps better career 
prospects) and to regions and countries (through 
its benefits for promoting sustainable growth 
and developing less advantaged areas). 
International labour migration may allow 
worker skills to be matched more effectively 
with job vacancies, and may facilitate the 
general up-skilling of European workforces. 
It may also offer an important adjustment 
mechanism within EMU, where, in the absence 
of country-specific monetary and exchange rate 
policies, labour market mobility would be 
4    See Introductory Statement of Mr. Trichet following the 
Governing Council meeting of 3 August, 2006.
5    The EU-15 refers to Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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beneficial in promoting the ability of national 
labour markets to adjust in the face of economic 
fluctuations and asymmetric shocks.
Despite the background of a generally low level 
of labour mobility within the EU-15, and the 
recognition of the possible benefits of increasing 
labour mobility, the expansion of the EU to 25 
Member States in May 2004 was accompanied 
by concerns over the possibility of a wave of 
migration – particularly of the low-skilled – 
from the ten new Member States to the EU-15. 
The major concerns for receiving countries 
included a potentially negative impact on wages 
and employment of the native population and 
the increased use of social security systems, 
particularly by migrants. In response, most 
EU-15 Member States (with the exception of 
the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden) took 
the decision to maintain restrictions on the 
cross-border mobility of labour from the EU-8 
(Malta and Cyprus were excluded from these 
restrictions), which delayed the migrant flow 
between the EU-8 and EU-15 Member States 
for up to seven years. This led some European 
institutions, such as the European Commission, 
to argue that following a possible initial, but 
temporary, increase in cross-border labour 
mobility between the EU-15 and the EU-10, 
labour mobility across Europe would most 
likely fall back to a low level (European 
Commission 20037). From 1 May 2006, Greece, 
Portugal, Finland, Spain and from July 2006 
also Italy decided to lift restrictions, while 
Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg decided to alleviate them. The 
restrictions remain unchanged in Austria and 
Germany.
The objective of this Occasional Paper is to 
consider the potential for increased cross-
border labour mobility within an enlarged EU 
in the medium to long run and the economic 
costs and benefits of increased labour migration 
to both sending and receiving countries. For the 
purposes of this Paper, cross-border labour 
mobility refers to the migration of workers8 
between countries and includes commuting 
where data permit. Section 2 starts with a 
review of the experiences of previous EU 
enlargements and the extent to which cross-
border labour mobility was affected. Section 3 
considers studies which have attempted to 
estimate the potential for East to West EU 
labour migration following the May 2004 EU 
enlargement. Section 4 summarises the barriers 
to international labour mobility that exist within 
the EU-15 and may influence the level of labour 
migration from the EU-10 to the EU-15. Section 
5 turns to an analysis of the key economic 
determinants of migration within the EU based 
on the academic literature. Section 6 presents 
numbers on the early labour market experiences 
of cross-border labour mobility following the 
2004 EU enlargement. Section 7 considers the 
potential economic costs and benefits of labour 
migration, both for host and home countries. 
Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2  THE EFFECTS OF PREVIOUS EU 
ENLARGEMENTS AND GERMAN 
REUNIFICATION ON GEOGRAPHICAL 
LABOUR MOBILITY
Evidence from earlier EU enlargements may be 
helpful in estimating the extent to which 
geographical labour mobility may increase in the 
medium to long term following the expansion of 
the EU to 25 members on 1 May 2004. Prior 
to this, there had been four other waves of 
enlargement since the European Community 
(EC) was created in 1967: (i) in January 1973, the 
United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland joined; 
(ii) in January 1981, Greece joined; (iii) in 
January 1986, Spain and Portugal joined and then 
(iv) in January 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden 
joined the newly created European Union. The 
accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal is often 
taken as the most comparable to the 2004 
7   European Commission (2003) “Impact of Economic and Social 
Integration on Employment in the Context of Enlargement” 
Final report.
8    Here we refer to the cross-border mobility of workers, not 
including the self-employed.9
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enlargement. This is primarily because high 
income and unemployment rate differentials 
existed between these three countries and the 
existing EU members at that time. Furthermore, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal were geographically 
close to, and had previous labour migration 
experiences towards, the EU they had joined. 
These waves of enlargement were similarly 
accompanied by strong concerns over the 
possibility of a wave of migration from new to 
old Member States9 – particularly of low-skilled 
workers – and, as a result, restrictions on labour 
mobility from the new to the old Member States 
were imposed for up to seven years.
Unique components of the 2004 enlargement 
include the fact that never before had so many 
countries joined the EU at the same time, 
although the total population of the EU-10 was 
about the same as the Southern enlargement 
(Greece, Spain and Portugal) as a percentage of 
the EU population that they were joining (at 
around 20%). Never before had the new 
countries such limited historical experience of 
free migration.10 Furthermore, as presented 
later, income gaps for the EU-10 were greater 
relative to the EU than those of Spain, Greece 
and Portugal. The Southern European countries 
had reached about two-thirds of the average EU 
per capita income at the point of their accession 
to the EU – whereas in some of the EU-10 this 
level was below one half (at PPP exchange 
rates). Geographical proximity is also a more 
important factor for the EU-10 in the 2004 
enlargement. Greece and Portugal had no 
common border with the EU when they joined 
and the shared border region between Spain and 
France experienced relatively high income 
levels. In contrast, half of the EU-10 share 
borders with Austria, Germany or Italy, some 
with large income differentials to the EU-15 
and some with high population densities. 
However, labour migration flows following the 
accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal suggest 
that the increase in labour market mobility 
following enlargement was limited. Dustmann 
et al. (2003)11 find that about 10,000 Greek 
citizens per year emigrated to the rest of the EU 
in the ten years following the end of restrictions 
on outward labour migration (a total increase of 
102,000).12 For Spain, net labour movement was 
towards the south as the number of Spanish 
immigrants decreased from around 495,000 in 
1986 to 474,000 in 1991 and 470,000 in 1997. 
From Portugal, about 5,000 Portuguese citizens 
emigrated to the rest of the EU in each of the six 
years following accession (the stock increasing 
from 825,000 in 1986 to 855,000 in 1991). 
Therefore, in total, emigration from the Southern 
Member States was found to equate to around 
79,000 migrants by the end of their regulated 
transition period. This was much lower than the 
estimated 1.5 to 1.6 million. This study finds no 
clear relationship between economic variables 
and migrant flows. Furthermore, it speculates 
that labour migration flows would not have been 
higher even in the absence of controlled 
transition periods. Thus, previous EU 
enlargements suggest that the mobility of labour 
within the EU may increase, at least in the short 
to medium run, but that this increase may not 
persist into the medium to long run. An important 
consideration for the impact of EU enlargement 
on long-term labour migration includes potential 
migrants’ expectations of future economic 
prospects. In Spain, for example, the reversed 
direction of migration was most likely a result 
of substantial improvement of living standards 
and job prospects in Spain, partly as a result of 
EU accession. 
A further historical episode in Europe is 
considered relevant for an understanding of the 
potential impact of EU enlargement on 
geographical labour mobility in Europe, namely 
9   Between 1.5 and 1.6 million migrants from Spain and Portugal 
were predicted to emigrate to the EU following the end of their 
regulated transition period (Straubhaar 1984).
10  Whilst the legal obstacles preventing outward migration from 
the East were abolished following the fall of communism, most 
restrictions on immigration in the main EU destination countries 
were kept in place. It is therefore difficult to estimate the 
migration pressures from the EU-10 that were accumulated 
during the years of the iron curtain. 
11  C. Dustmann, M. Casanova, M. Fertig, I. Preston and C. Schmidt 
(2003), “The impact of EU enlargement on migration flows”, 
Home Office report 25/03.
12  See also Salt, J., Clarke, J. and S. Schmidt (2000); “Patterns 
and Trends in International Migration in Western Europe”, 
Eurostat.
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the reunification of Germany in 1990. The 
primary motivation for this comparison is the 
high income differentials that existed between 
East and West Germany, and the experiences of 
a region with a communist past joining together 
with a market economy (see, for example, Sinn 
199913). However, it is important to note that 
this episode also included a number of unique 
factors which are not applicable to the most 
recent expansion of the EU. For example, from 
the 1990s to the present day, the EU-10 have 
undertaken a process of social, political and 
economic transformation following the fall of 
communism and prior to enlargement; whereas, 
for German enlargement, much of this process 
had to occur following unification. Furthermore, 
East and West Germany had existed as one 
country less than 50 years prior to re-unification 
– the potential migrants spoke the same 
language, had strong family connections and 
cultural and regional proximity. This episode 
might therefore, at most, be an interesting 
reference in terms of some “upper bound” 
estimate of the degree to which labour mobility 
may increase following enlargement.
The increase in labour mobility following 
German unification was significant – 1.2 million 
East Germans had entered the West by 1998 and 
1.1 million Germans moved from West to East 
Germany over this period (Burda 200014). In the 
two years immediately following unification, 
the flow of migration from East to West Germany 
was significantly larger than that in the opposite 
direction. From 1992 onwards, however, the 
numbers levelled out, and in the medium term 
net migration was to the West, at an average rate 
of about 14,000 people per year (or a total of 
70,000) since 2000. German unification was 
also important with regard to the immigration 
experiences of workers from further east. 
Immigration from the EU-10 into the EU-15 
stood at a peak of around 300,000 people in 
1990, immediately following the fall of the 
Berlin wall. Net immigration then declined 
sharply following the German recession of 1993 
and was estimated to be below 50,000 people 
per year in the second half of the 1990s and 
early 2000s (Brücker et al 200315). 
3  ESTIMATES OF MIGRATION FLOWS 
FOLLOWING EXPANSION OF THE EU 
TO 25 MEMBER STATES
A number of studies have attempted to estimate 
the impact of the 2004 EU enlargement on 
migration flows from the EU-10 to the EU-15. 
The methodologies used to derive these 
estimates of East-West migration differ widely 
– varying from the application of econometric 
models, such as migration supply functions to 
the analysis of survey evidence, for example 
through the collection of individual intentions 
through questionnaires. A critical review of this 
body of literature is presented in Dustmann et 
al. (2003). This Paper argues that an implicit 
assumption in most econometric models is that 
migration is permanent, although many modern 
migrations in Europe have been found to be 
temporary (Dustmann 199616), which may lead 
to an upward bias on many estimates of future 
migration. Second, econometric frameworks 
often assume that migration responds solely to 
economic considerations. However, labour 
migration in Europe in the post-war period has 
been heavily regulated and most large migration 
experiences were connected with historical 
events (e.g. the end of the Second World War, 
and the Hungarian revolution in 1956). This 
affects the ability of models to predict future 
labour migration potential. Third, the available 
data on migration has a number of shortcomings, 
often relating to its absence, or imprecise 
measurement. Drawbacks from survey evidence 
are argued to be related to the fact that they rely 
on individual intentions which are imperfectly 
realised.
With these caveats in mind, Box 1 summarises the 
conclusions of a number of the key studies 
13  Sinn, H.-W. (1999) “EU enlargement, migration and lessons 
from German Unification”, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2171.
14    Burda, M. (2005), “What kind of shock was it? Regional 
integration of Eastern Germany after unifications”, Paper 
presented at the AEA meetings January 2006, Boston.
15    Brücker, B., Alvarez-Plata, P., and B. Siliverstovs (2003), 
“Potential Migration from Central and Eastern Europe to the 
EU-15 – An Update”, Report for the European Commission, DG 
Employment and Social Affairs.
16    C. Dustmann, (1996); “Return migration: The European 
Experience”, Economic Policy, Vol. 22, pp. 215-50.11
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Box 1 
ESTIMATES OF EAST-WEST MIGRATION FOLLOWING EU ENLARGEMENT 
Layard et al. 
(1994)1
Extrapolation analysis 
based on previous South-
North migration in Europe 
between 1950 and 1970
Migration potential of Central and Eastern European 
countries: 3% of total population emigrating within 
15 years – or around 2.1 million people.
Franzmeyer and 
Brücker (1997)2
Regression analysis Annual East-West migration from Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary: between 





based on income 
differentials
Annual East-West migration from Poland, Slovakia, 





Regression analysis Ultimately at least 3% of the population of 




Regression analysis 335,000 people a year could move from the ten 
accession states in the first ten years following 
enlargement.
Sinn et al. 
(2000)6
Macro model-based 
calculation  and regression 
analysis
Long run immigration of 6-10% of the total 
population of origin countries (around 4-5 million 
people over 15 years following enlargement). 
Brücker et al. 
(2000)7
Regression analysis Annual East-West migration from ten Central and 
Eastern European States would start at the level of 





Regression analysis This above figure was revised downwards to 286,000 
immigrants in the first year, resulting in between 
3.2 million and 4.5 million immigrants by 2030. This 
is equivalent to an increase in the population of the 
EU-15 of between 0.7% and 1.2%.
Dustmann et al 
(2003)9
Survey analysis 2.22 million temporary migrants, with up to 
1.11 million of these possibly migrating 
permanently, from Central and Eastern European 
Countries – no time period suggested. 
Source: Fassmann, H. and R. Munz (eds), “Ost-West Wanderung in Europa”, Boehlau-Verlag, Vienna-Cologne-Weimar, extended by the 
authors. 
1  Layard, R., Blanchard, O., Dornbusch, R., and Krugman, P. (1994), “East-West Migration, The Alternatives”, MIT, Boston.
2  Franzmeyer, F. and Brücker, H. (1997), “Europäische Union: Osterweiterung und Arbeitskräftemigration”, DIW-Berlin Wochenberichte 5.
3  Walterskirchen, E. and Dietz, R. (1998), “Auswirkungen der EU-Osterweiterung auf den Österreichischen Arbeitsmarkt”, WIFO, Vienna.
4  Bauer T. and Zimmermann K. (1999), “Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure and its Labour Market Impact following EU Enlargement 
to Central and Eastern Europe”, A study for the department for education and employment (United Kingdom), Bonn.
5  European Commission (2000), “The impact of Eastern Enlargement on Employment and Labour Markets in the EU Member States“, Report 
by the European Integration Consortium on behalf of the Employment and Social Affairs Directorate General of the European Commission, 
Berlin.
6  Sinn, H.-W., Flaig, G., Werding, M., Munz, S., Duell, N., and Hofmann, H., (2000), “EU-Erweiterung and Arbeitskräftemigration: Wege zu 
einer schrittweisen Annäherung der Arbeitsmärkte”, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Berlin.
7  Brücker, H., Berlitz, H., Bornhorst, F., Edin, P., Mertig, M., Frediksson, H., Hofer, H., Hoenekopp, P., Huber, P., Kreyenfeld, M., Lundborg, 
P., Moebius, U., Roulstone, D., Schrettl, W., Schraepler, J., Schumacher, D., and Truebswetter, P. (2000), “Studie über die Auswirkung der 
EU-Erweiterung auf die Beschäftigung und die Arbeitsmärkte in den Mitgliedstaaten” Final report: Part 1: Analysis, Brussels.
8  European Commission (2003), “Impact of Economic and Social Integration on Employment in the Context of Enlargement” Final report.
9  Dustmann, C., Casanova, M., Fertig, M., Preston, I., and C. Schmidt (2003), “The impact of EU enlargement on migration flows”, Home 
Office report 25/03. 
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estimating migration flow – using both econometric 
and survey methodology. The majority of these 
studies indicate a potential migration flow of 
between 1-4% of the total population of the 
EU-10, i.e. between 1 and 3 million people within 
one to two decades after EU-wide freedom of 
movement is granted to citizens of all EU-10 
countries. Taking into account the possibility of 
migrants returning home, estimated net migration 
lies at about 1.5 million over the same horizon (for 
comparison, total net migration from the rest of 
the world to the EU-15 was estimated at around 
1.75 million people in 2003 alone17). This net 
migration flow represents about 0.4% of the total 
EU-15 population. Furthermore, set against the 
background of demographic change and the 
decline in and ageing of the EU-25 populations, 
this expected increase in migration potential seems 
moderate. It should be noted, however, that a few 
studies, focusing on a shorter time horizon, 
estimate a significantly larger migration potential. 
Most of the migration flow in these studies is 
expected to be temporary, rather than 
permanent.18
4 BARRIERS  TO  GEOGRAPHICAL  LABOUR 
MOBILITY WITHIN THE EU
The experiences of previous waves of EU 
enlargement suggest that the increase in cross-
border labour mobility following enlargement 
was moderate – particularly in the medium to 
long run. Furthermore, most economic studies 
estimating the potential increase in labour flow 
following the 2004 enlargement suggest a 
moderate potential migrant worker flow from 
the EU-10 to the EU-15. These experiences and 
predictions are in line with the generally low 
level of geographical labour mobility within the 
EU. The European Commission (2001)19 finds 
that EU citizens “have about half the mobility 
rate of US citizens. In the last ten years, 38% of 
EU citizens changed residence … 68% moved 
within the same town or village, 36% moved to 
another town in the same region … 21% moved 
to another region in the same Member State and 
only 4.4% moved to another Member State.” 
Commuting is found to be the most frequent 
form of EU cross-border geographic labour 
mobility. A number of reasons have been 
suggested for the generally low level of 
international labour mobility in Europe, which 
may also limit increased labour mobility within 
an enlarged EU. This section turns to a brief 
consideration of these issues.
In the economics literature, frequently cited 
reasons for barriers to international geographical 
labour mobility within the EU-15 include: the 
existence of legal and administrative barriers20; 
the lack of familiarity with other European 
languages21 and cultures; the monetary costs of 
moving22; inefficient housing markets23, the 
limited portability of pension rights; the lack of 
clarity in the international recognition of 
professional qualifications; and non-formal 
learning and the lack of transparency of job 
openings. It is difficult to think of reasons for 
why many, if not all, of these barriers would be 
any lower between the EU-10 and the EU-15 
Member States than between Member States of 
the EU-15 itself. Indeed, some barriers, such as 
the recognition of qualifications, may be far 
higher for nationals of the EU-10 in the early 
post-enlargement period, although they may 
decrease over time. Such barriers are therefore 
likely to also limit the cross-border mobility of 
labour from the EU-10 to the EU-15.
17  European Commission (2006), “Labour Migration patterns in 
Europe, recent trends, future challenges”.
18   For example, earlier generations of migrants from the East 
tended to settle permanently in the West. However, today’s 
East-West migrant flows include large numbers of temporary 
migrants who work on seasonal contracts or student visas.
19  European Commission (2001) “High level task force on Skills 
and Mobility: Final Report”, Directorate-General for 
Employment and Social Affairs, Unit EMPL/A.3., December.
20 Such barriers include for example, rules which restrict the 
creation of a company in another Member State or restrictions 
on the reallocation of staff and the use of temporary and 
employment agency staff (European Commission 2002b). The 
interaction between tax systems of different countries may also 
create legal and administrative problems.
21  The European Commission (2001): Only half the EU population 
speaks any other EU language than their own. According to this 
study, both the lack of language skills and the slowness of their 
distribution put a further constraint on mobility.
22  Including costs of moving residence related to high property 
prices and fixed costs including taxes to buying and selling a 
property.
23  See also ECB (2003), “Structural factors in the EU Housing 
Markets”.13
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Table 1 Policies towards migrants from the EU-8 for the period 1 May 2004 to 30 April 2006
BE  Belgium imposed restrictions on labour migration from the EU-8, applying its system of work permits.
DK  Denmark imposed restrictions on labour migration from the EU-8. Immigrants could enter the country to seek 
work, however they had no automatic access to benefits during this period. On finding a job, immigrants from the 
EU-8 had to apply for a special work and residence permit, which was only granted for full-time positions on terms 
corresponding to those normally applying on the Danish labour market (for example, at the normal Danish wage for 
that position). If unable to find a job, or on losing their employment, immigrants lost the right to a resident permit and 
had to leave Denmark.
DE  Germany imposed restrictions on labour migration from the EU-8. It maintained its existing system of work permits. 
Existing deals with EU-8 members, such as with Polish seasonal workers, continued to apply. Quotas continued for 
temporary workers in construction and agriculture.
GR  Greece imposed restrictions on labour migration from the EU-8, applying its system of work permits.
ES  Spain imposed restrictions on labour migration from the EU-8, applying its system of work permits.
FR  France imposed restrictions on labour migration from the EU-8. It maintained its existing work permit system where 
permits are issued on the basis of a number of criteria, including the job offer, salary offer and qualifications of 
the applicant. Immigrants from the EU-8 managing to obtain a work permit had the same access to social security 
as French citizens and could bring their family with them, who had full access to the labour market. Different rules 
applied for seasonal workers, students, au pairs and researchers.
IE  Ireland opened its door to immigrants from the EU-8, but restrictions on the receipt of welfare benefits applied. This 
change in legal status and labour market access applied to both post 1 May 2004 arrivals and to EU-8 nationals who 
had previously been working or resident in Ireland before 1 May 2004, either legally or illegally. Immigrants from the 
EU-8, and all other EU countries with the exception of the United Kingdom, were not eligible for welfare benefits in 
Ireland for the first two years of employment. Unlike in the United Kingdom, nationals of the EU-8 did not require 
special certificates after taking up employment in Ireland.  
IT  Italy imposed restrictions on labour migration from the EU-8. An immigration quota was in place which limited the 
number of migrants from the EU-8 to a maximum of 20,000 per year.
LU  Luxembourg imposed restrictions on labour migration from the EU-8. 
NL  The Netherlands imposed restrictions on labour migration from the EU-8. For EU-8 nationals, access to the labour 
market through the issue of a work permit was granted only when Dutch nationals were unavailable to fill a position. 
AT  Austria imposed restrictions on labour migration from the EU-8 by applying its system of work permits.
PT  Portugal imposed restrictions on labour migration from the EU-8. Migrants were required to apply for a work permit, 
however the annual number of work permits issued to foreign workers was limited to 6,500 per annum. Any new work 
permits issued to EU-8 nationals therefore had to fall within this quota.
FI  Finland imposed restrictions on labour migration from the EU-8. In normal circumstances, migrants had to apply for a 
work permit and were able to fill a position without a work permit only in the case that no local labour was available. 
Summer fruit pickers were exempt. 
SE  Sweden opened its door to immigrant labour from the EU-8. Some measures were introduced to allow the greater 
control of subcontractors in building projects, the monitoring of false self-employment and to allow trade unions 
to check that collective agreements were being observed in workplaces where they have no representatives. A 
commission was set up to look at ways to limit the right to social welfare of citizens of other EU states looking for 
work in Sweden. 
UK  The United Kingdom opened its door to immigrants from the EU-8, but restrictions on the receipt of welfare benefits 
applied. EU-8 nationals had to register under a Workers Registration Scheme if they wished to work and only received 
unemployment and income support benefits following continuous employment for one year. Other benefits were 
available immediately for those in work. Workers could bring their family with them, who then had full access to the 
labour market.
Sources: EIRO (2004), “Controversy over rules for workers from the new EU Member States”, www.eiro.eurofound.ie; EIRO (2004), 
“Parliament rejects transitional rules for workers from new EU Member States”, www.eiro.eurofound.ie; Euractiv.com; Financial 
Times; Home Office (2004) Immigration and Nationality Directive; Ruhs, M., (2004), “Ireland, A Crash Course in Immigration Policy”, 
Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, Oxford University; www.workpermit.com. 
Note: There is no common immigration policy across the EU. The most wide-ranging policy is a consequence of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
which came into force in May 1999. This Treaty secured an overarching legislative framework and the coordination of EU Member 
States’ actions with regard to immigration and asylum policy for the EU-15. However, three EU-15 Member States (United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Denmark) do not fully participate in this treaty, together with the EU-10, and the directive governing the establishment of 
common definitions, procedures and criteria for the entry and residence of immigrant workers has yet to be concluded. Immigration 
policy is instead regulated by national or regional policy, which in turn creates a broad range of entry requirements and immigration 
procedures, the specifics of which vary by country.
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In addition to these barriers, temporary legal 
restrictions on geographical labour mobility 
were imposed on most of the EU-10 Member 
States by most of the old EU-15 Member States 
following the practices of past rounds of EU 
accession. Although the free movement of 
persons is one of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed to EU citizens, and includes the 
right to work and live in another Member State, 
in both the 1981 Greek accession and the 1986 
Spanish/Portuguese accession, a seven-year 
transition period was imposed before workers 
from the new member countries could work 
throughout the EU. The rationale for the 
transition period was to ensure that labour 
migration from one country did not have a 
sudden and adverse impact on another country’s 
economy.
Under the 2003 accession arrangements, the 
introduction of the part of Community law on 
the free movement of workers across the 
enlarged EU can be deferred for a period of up 
to seven years, broken down into three sub-
periods in a 2+3+2 system. The first two-year 
period commenced on 1 May 2004 and finished 
on 30 April 2006. During this period, a number 
of EU-15 countries (the exceptions being the 
United Kingdom, Sweden and Ireland) decided 
to apply their national immigration policy to 
labour from the EU-8 (Malta and Cyprus are 
excluded from these restrictions).
Table 1 summarises the broad policies on 
migrant workers in place in the EU-15 during 
this period.24 Although the United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Sweden opted out of imposing 
limits on the migration of labour, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom tightened the conditions of 
access to their social security benefit systems. 
Furthermore, in the EU-10 countries, Malta 
issued work permits to immigrants from the EU 
for monitoring purposes and Poland, Slovenia 
and Hungary applied reciprocal restrictions on 
labour from those EU-15 Member States 
imposing restrictions on the EU-10. All EU-10 
Member States opened their labour markets up 
to workers from other EU-10 countries. 
In February 2006, in accordance with Paragraph 
3(2) of the transitional arrangements on the 
freedom of movement for persons annexed to 
the 2003 Treaty of Accession, the European 
Commission produced a report assessing the 
labour market experiences of the EU-15 
following enlargement. On the basis of this 
report, the EU-15 Member States had to decide 
whether to continue, stop, or introduce 
temporary restrictions on labour migration 
from the EU-10. They had to notify the European 
Commission of their intentions for the second 
three-year phase by the end of April 2006. In 
the absence of any notification, Community 
law on the free movement of labour applied 
from 1 May 2006. Member States that decided 
to lift their restrictions on 1 May 2006 included 
Greece, Portugal, Finland and Spain and from 
July 2006 also Italy, while Belgium, Denmark, 
France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
decided to alleviate them. The restrictions 
remain unchanged in Austria and Germany. 
Slovenia decided to no longer apply reciprocal 
restrictions. Countries lifting restrictions will 
have the possibility to reintroduce them 
throughout the remainder of the transitional 
period. At the end of the fifth year following 
enlargement, all transitional arrangements 
should come to an end, but may be extended for 
a further two years in the case of serious labour 
market imbalances. At the end of the seven-year 
period – on 30 April 2011 – all EU Member 
States must open up their labour market to the 
EU-8 in all circumstances.
Thus, temporary regulations have effectively 
restricted the migrant flow between the EU-8 
and the EU-15 since 1 May 2004 for up to seven 
years. The restrictions may lead to an increase 
in illegal undeclared work, bogus claims of 
self-employment, contract work and service 
provision.25 Thus, although mobility flows will 
ultimately be driven by the demand and supply 
24  For the details by country of origin and country of intended 
work, see www.europa.eu.int/eures/home.jsp?lang=en. 
25  See European Commission (2006), “Report on the functioning 
of the transitional Agreements set out in the 2003 Accession 
Treaty”.15
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factors, these temporary regulations may delay 
and possibly distort labour market adjustments. 
By 20 April 2011 at the latest, such legal 
barriers to labour mobility across the enlarged 
EU will cease to exist. The other remaining 
barriers to labour mobility posed, for example, 
by the limited portability of pension rights, 
the lack of transparency of job openings 
and the international recognition of 
qualifications, are areas to be targeted by 
employment policy within Lisbon agenda 
for jobs and growth.
5  THE KEY ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF 
MIGRATION
This section turns to what the economics 
literature tells us about the determinants of 
labour migration, with a focus on the factors 
likely to be most important for East-West labour 
migration potential following the 2004 EU 
enlargement. The central elements of the 
economic determinants of migration are 
summarised in Box 2. On balance, this analysis 
also suggests a moderate aggregate labour 
Box 2
THE DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION
(i) Neo-classical approach: Considers the migration decision as an individual’s decision. The 
most important determinants of migration under this school of thought are:
•  The costs of migration including transport costs, income losses during migration and 
psychological costs. This suggests that migration can be interpreted as an investment, since 
the present costs have to be paid off in the future. Costs are therefore negatively related to 
the probability of migrating.
•  The expected income from work, which is a function of wage and the probability of getting 
a job. Therefore, even if the probability of getting a job is small, an individual may migrate 
if the wage differential is sufficiently high.
•  The existence of social security systems, which means that unemployment does not 
necessarily equate to no income.
•  Information/search costs: this may be a function of the distance from the receiving country 
and “network” effects, i.e. connections between individuals in a host country and friends 
and relatives left at home.
•  The age of the individual: the probability of migration has been found to decrease with 
age.
•  Skill levels: strong demand for particular skill groups may encourage migration.
•  Expected developments in home and receiving country: it may be disadvantageous to 
migrate if the development in the home country is positive or negative in the target 
country.
(ii) “New economics of migration” considers the household as the core decision-maker.
•  Individual family members migrate, because the dependence on the labour market situation 
is reduced. However, singles still make up a higher proportion of immigrants than family 
members. 
•  Individual’s relative income position within a society is important. Migration is influenced 
by income inequality in the home country. There is a higher incentive to emigrate if one is 
poor among the rich, rather than poor among the poor.
Source: Fertig, M. and C. Schmidt (2002) „Mobility within Europe – What do we (still not) know?”, IZA discussion paper No. 447, 
compiled by the authors.





Occasional Paper No. 52
October 2006
migration potential, particularly in the medium 
to long run. However, it also highlights that 
labour migration experiences may not be 
uniform across the EU, with some countries 
more likely to host immigrant workers (e.g. due 
to network effects and geographical location) 
and other countries more likely to be the source 
countries (e.g. due to high youth unemployment 
rates). 
5.1 WAGE  AND  INCOME  DIFFERENTIALS 
BETWEEN THE EU-8 AND THE EU-15 
One of the main arguments for cross-border 
labour migration in the economics literature is 
related to wage differentials between the host 
and sending country. It is argued that the 
probability of migration is positively related to 
the size of any wage or income differential. 
However, the strength of this effect is not 
obvious. A UN survey,26 for instance, concludes 
that the responsiveness of aggregate migration 
to international income and wage differences is 
fairly low. It is also not obvious which measure 
of wages is most relevant to potential migrants 
in their labour migration decision. Generally, 
wage levels converted at PPP (purchasing power 
parity) may be most appropriate for a 
consideration of labour migration flow, since 
this measure accounts for differences in price 
Table 2 Gross monthly wage levels in % of the EU-15 wage level (2004)
in % of EU-15 wage level in % of German wage level
At current exchange 
rates
At PPP exchange 
rates 
At current exchange 
rates
At PPP exchange 
rates 
CZ 28 52 27 51
EE 23 40 23 39
LV 17 34 16 33
LT 17 35 16 34
HU 30 52 29 51
PL 25 50 24 48
SI 54 71 52 69
SK 18 37 18 36
weighted 
average
25 49 25 47
Sources: Dresdner Bank (2004) and ECB calculations.
levels in the home and host countries. For 
commuting, wage differentials at market 
exchange rates are more important, because 
commuters are likely to spend most of their 
income in their home country.
Table 2 shows that the absolute gap in wage 
levels between the EU-8 and the EU-15 is 
generally high (looking at wage differences 
compared to Germany suggests a wage gap of 
a similar magnitude). In 2004, wage levels 
converted at market exchange rates ranged 
between 54% of the EU-15 average in Slovenia 
to only around 17% in Latvia and Lithuania. 
At PPP exchange rates, the degree of wage 
convergence is larger, but the difference is still 
substantial. Both measures therefore suggest a 
large labour migration potential.
This finding is also supported when considering 
the absolute gap in per capita income levels in 
2005 (see Table 3). This measure serves as a 
rough proxy for both the convergence already 
achieved and the remaining gap in productivity 
levels and living standards between the countries 
of EU-8 and the EU-15 average. Per capita 
income levels in PPP range from 44% of the 
EU-15 average in Latvia to 74% in Slovenia. 
26  UN (1997), World Population Monitoring, New York.17
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For comparison, when Greece acceded in 1981, 
PPP-GDP levels were at 65% of the EU-15 
average, and when Spain and Portugal acceded 
in 1986, PPP-GDP levels were at 66% and 70% 
of the EU-15 average respectively.27 Thus, for 
some EU-8 countries, such as the Baltic States, 
the absolute gap in per capita income levels to 
the EU-15 is still well above the levels of 
previous enlargements which would suggest a 
large labour migration potential from these 
countries. For other countries, however, 
particularly Slovenia and the Czech Republic, 
income levels relative to the EU-15 are 
comparable with previous enlargement 
experiences – suggesting a possibly smaller 
pool of potential migrants.
A third measure – the expected growth rate of 
real GDP per capita – is also relevant, since it 
reveals information about the expected path of 
income over time28, and about real convergence 
in the standard of living between the EU-15 and 
the EU-8. Table 3 presents two scenarios 
regarding the possible rate of convergence in 
per capita income (at PPP). The results of this 
simple exercise vary somewhat depending on 
the assumptions made, but generally suggest 
that after 15 years of EU membership, 
considerable progress with convergence in per 
capita income is likely to have been achieved 
for a number of EU-8 countries, although real 
convergence will not have been sufficient to 
close the income gap. 
Any labour flow from the EU-8 is therefore 
likely to decrease in the medium term as the 
EU-8 catch up to the EU-15 average, making 
labour migration less attractive relative to the 
costs that migration entails. Empirical evidence 
demonstrates that the pace of economic growth 
appears to be a very important factor influencing 
labour migration.29 When a catching up economy 
Table 3 Projected convergence in per capita income levels1) as a percentage of the EU-15 
average, 15 years following EU accession
In 2005
In 2019
4-2 scenario 10 year average scenario
CZ 67 87 66
EE 52 66 86
LV 44 57 76
LT 49 62 75
HU 56 72 69
PL 46 60 55
SI 74 96 89
SK 50 65 61
Sources: European Commission, ECB calculations. 
Notes: The “4-2 scenario” assumes 4% average annual real GDP growth in the EU-8, and 2% average annual growth in the EU-15. The 
“10 years average scenario” assumes an average annual real GDP growth rate in each country, calculated as the average growth rate of 
the last ten years. Population growth is assumed to be zero in both scenarios, given the very small prospective change of the populations 
of the countries in question over the next 15 years, based on the UN demographic projections.
1) At PPP.
27  H. Brücker et al., (2003), “Potential Migration from Central and 
Eastern Europe into EU-15”, DIW, Berlin.
28  Consistent with the theory, this assumes that individuals will 
consider the discounted present value of their expected lifetime 
consumption in their decision whether or not to migrate.
29  Empirical evidence from a number of countries suggests that the 
relationship between economic development and migration is 
not a linear one, but it is more likely to follow an inverse 
U-curve type pattern. According to this view migration is very 
limited at a low level of economic development when a large 
share of the population is missing the financial means and 
sufficient information for seeking better life opportunities by 
migration to another country. Migration tends to peak at an 
intermediate level of development and after reaching its peak 
decrease with any further increase of per capita. Most European 
countries have already reached their peak long time ago. In 
Portugal for instance the peak was reached in around the 
end of 1960s (see more on this in P. A. Fischer, R. Martin, 
T. Straubhaar (1997), “Interdependencies between Development 
and Migration” in International Migration, Immobility and 
Development”, edited by T. Hammar, G. Brochmann, K. 
Thomas, T. Faist). The EU-8 are certainly not in an early stage 
of economic development, and although it is difficult to tell 
their exact position in their inverse U-curve it seems likely that 
most of them already passed or close to the peak. Further 
income convergence of these countries should therefore lead to 
less migration.
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30  See International Organisation for Migration, (2005), ”World 
Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of International 
Migration”.
31  T. Straubhaar (2001), “Migration Policies and EU Enlargement, 
East-West Migration: Will it be a problem?”, Intereconomics, 
July/August.
32  D. Marin (2004), “A Nation of Poets and Thinkers – less so with 
Eastern Enlargement? Austria and Germany”, Discussion Paper 
Series, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
33  Another finding of this paper suggests that not only labour 
intensive, but increasingly skill intensive activities (e.g. 
research) were transferred to Central and Eastern Europe. The 
key reason behind this was a severe skill shortage in Germany 
and Austria. The study argues that if Germany and Austria find 
it important to keep high skilled activities at home, the best 
response would be the liberalisation of their labour markets 
towards skilled labour from Central and Eastern Europe.
34  H. P. Lankes; A. Venables (1996), “Foreign Direct Investment in 
Economic Transition: the changing pattern of investments,” 
Economics of Transition, Vol. 4 (2).
35 The study by Forslid, Haaland Knarvik and Maestad (2002) 
conducted model simulations capturing comparative advantage 
mechanisms and intra-industry agglomeration forces. While 
their results suggest relatively small impact of industry 
relocation for EU-15, they also find that individual sectors 
(such as the textiles or transport equipment sectors) potentially 
face strong effects (see also F. Forslid, J. Haaland, K. H. Knarvik, 
O. Maestad (2002) “Integration and Transition”, Economics of 
Transition, Vol. 10 (1)).
36  S. Drinkwater (2002), “Go West? Assessing the willingness to 
move from Central and Eastern European Countries”, University 
of Surrey.
is successful in creating conditions for broad 
based economic growth and job creation, 
labour migration pressure is likely to taper off, 
even when large wage differentials persist.30 
Expectations of the EU-8 citizens towards 
developments within their own countries may 
therefore also be a very important determinant 
of the labour migration flow from new to old 
Member States, particularly in the medium to 
long run.
The movement of capital and trade in goods and 
services will also affect the extent and speed 
with which income and wage levels converge, 
and therefore the potential flow of migrants. It 
has been argued, for example, that “to an 
important degree, trade has replaced the 
economic demand for migration in the EU”.31 
Substantially increased international trade 
should accelerate the real convergence of the 
EU-8 to the EU-15 and may therefore also 
dampen the labour migration effect. A 
potentially more important factor is foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and the relocation of 
some part of production from the EU-15 to the 
EU-8. FDI should help economic growth and 
wage convergence in the EU-8. In the medium 
run this should decrease labour migration 
pressure and contribute to welfare both in the 
EU-8 and the EU-15. 
Interestingly, in the public debate, there are 
similar concerns attached to the mobility of 
capital towards the EU-8 as to the mobility of 
labour from the EU-8. These concerns are 
mainly related to the potential job losses 
resulting from the outsourcing of manufacturing 
activities. In a recent work, Marin (2004)32 
considers empirical evidence from a survey 
covering 80% of German and 100% of Austrian 
FDI in Central and Eastern Europe (not just the 
EU-8). This study finds that FDI investment to 
Central and Eastern Europe is likely to cause 
fairly low job losses, and plays an important 
role in sustaining the competitiveness of many 
German and Austrian companies in an 
increasingly competitive environment33. Other 
empirical studies, such as the paper of Lankes 
and Venables (1996)34 which is based on 
company surveys, suggest that the main driving 
force behind the relocation of production to 
Central and Eastern Europe is not necessarily 
lower wages but rather to gain access to fast 
growing markets. These investments imply 
further growth and more jobs (rather than job 
losses) in the home country firms. Theoretical 
work conducted in the area of industrial 
restructuring suggest a small impact of industry 
relocation for the EU-15 as a whole.35 
5.2  WAGES RELATIVE TO THE COSTS OF 
LABOUR MIGRATION
The convergence of real wages does not need to 
be complete for labour migration pressure to 
disappear. However, the migration literature 
argues that any wage gap must be smaller than 
the costs of migration. A questionnaire by 
Drinkwater (2002)36 suggests that the 
willingness of Central Europeans to move 
geographically is not significantly higher on 
average than for Western Europeans. This might 
be a sign of the fact that the costs of migration, 19
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Table 4 Stock of residents from the EU-8 in EU-15 countries 
  AT  DK  FI  DE  IT  LU  SE  Total  Share of EU-8  Share of EU 8
Year  2001  2003 2001  2001  2002 2003 2001    immigrangs  as  migrants  as
               a  percentage  a  percentage
                  of the total   of EU 8
               population  population
               ot  these  7  EU
               15  Memeber
               S t a t e s
CZ 7,313  412  125  38,504  3,468  173  471  50,466  0.49  0.70
EE 54  523  10,839  3,880  205  131  1,662  17,294  1.28  1.88
LV  153 894 227  8,543  467  41 780  11,105  0.47  0.69
LT 208  1,583  204  11,156  322  32  727  14,232  0.41  0.61
HU 12,729  457  654  55,978  3,066  417  2,727  76,028  0.75  1.09
PL 21,841  5,410  694  310,432  29,282  885  15,511  384,055  0.99  1.44
SI 6,893  56  10  19,395  1,583  72  627  28,636  1.44  2.05
SK 7,739  216  51  23,004  6  114  363  31,493  0.58  0.57
Total 56,930  9,551  12,804  470,892  38,399  1,865  22,868  613,309  0.83  1.20
Sources: Brücker et al. (2003), national statistical offices, Eurostat and own calculations.
including non-financial costs often exceed 
even substantial gains stemming from higher 
potential income levels. However, there are a 
number of factors that may decrease the costs 
of migration. Among these factors, the 
“network” effect is particularly important. The 
number of migrants of the same nationality in a 
host country significantly decreases the 
psychological costs (e.g. detachment from home 
culture) to migration and the risk of migration 
(e.g. through easing the costs associated with 
finding work and/or accommodation) for 
potential migrants. 
Table 5 Country of first choice for the potential migrants
(percentages)
Home country: Total Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia 
Receiving Country:
Germany   37.0   42.6   31.4   37.4   36.3
Austria   24.4   22.6   30.5   17.8   25.9
UK     6.4     9.2     3.8     4.5     7.1
France     4.1     2.9     4.3     5.4     4.1
Italy     3.9     5.8     2.3     5.1     2.6
Scandinavia     3.3     2.7     4.9     3.1     2.5
Netherlands     2.8     3.4     2.2     3.5     2.3
CEE     2.8     2.5 -     0.5     6.3
Overseas1)     6.4 -   14.9   15.0 -
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Fassman, Hintermann (1997), Fassman, Münz (2002).
1) United States, Canada, Australia.
Network factors suggest that Austria and 
Germany could expect to receive a large share 
of the immigration from the EU-8 – due to their 
relatively high populations of foreign nationals 
from these countries – and that Poland may be 
the key source of migrants – due to its relatively 
large population and its high number of citizens 
living in the EU-15 and, in particular, Germany 
(see Table 4). Furthermore, costs of migration 
are a function of distance from the receiving 
country which again seems to favour Germany 
and Austria as destination countries. 
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Table 5 presents the results of a survey by 
Fassman et al. (1997 and 2002)37 which collected 
information on immigration intentions for the 
four largest EU-8 countries. The conclusion 
from this survey confirmed that more than a 
third of respondents would choose Germany as 
their prime destination and about a quarter 
would choose Austria. Intentions to go to other 
EU countries were generally much lower. A 
potential drawback, however, from such survey 
evidence is related to the fact that it relies on 
individual intentions, which are often 
imperfectly realised.
5.3  THE PROBABILITY OF FINDING A JOB AND 
ACCESS TO SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
High levels of unemployment at home relative 
to a host country is a further factor put forward 
by the economics literature as likely to increase 
the incentive to migrate38. First, Chart 1 presents 
the total unemployment rates for countries of 
the EU-25 in 2005. It suggests higher potential 
migrant flows from countries such as Poland 
and Slovakia where average unemployment is 
significantly higher than in the EU-15.
The economics literature also suggests that 
young workers are relatively mobile. Brücker et 
al. (2003)39 find that around 70% of the workers 
from the EU-8 living within the EU-15 are in 
the 25-to-44 age group. Chart 2 therefore 
presents the unemployment rates for young 
people (under the age of 25) within the countries 
of the EU-25. It supports the conclusion of the 
previous paragraph that potential migrant flows 
may be particularly high from Poland and 
Slovakia. However, projections of the size of 
the young population (aged between 0 and 14 
years) by the European Commission suggest 
that the fall in the size of the young population 
in the new Member States will be even more 
severe than in EU-15 (see Table 6). In particular, 
while in the EU-15 the size of the young 
population is expected to decline by 4.5% by 
2020, the decline is expected to be around 16% 
in the new Member States. This is likely to 
significantly decrease migration pressure from 
the new Member States. Moreover, as a result 
of their demographic decline, the new Member 
States will be likely to face a new challenge to 
attract and integrate a large number of young 
migrants from third countries. 
Regional unemployment may also be an 
important determinant of potential labour 
migration flow. The average unemployment rate 
in the Western part of Central Europe is well 
below the national averages in the individual 
countries. This factor is likely to contain labour 
migration flows in the bordering regions of 
Germany and Austria from these direct 
neighbours. A possible exception is a region in 
Poland with very high unemployment which 
borders Germany, which may result in an 
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37  Fassmann, H.; Münz, R. (2002), “EU Enlargement and Future 
East-West Migration”, International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM), New Challenges for Migration Policy in Central and 
Eastern Europe.
38  This effect is likely to be strongest for low-skilled workers, but 
may also be the case for skilled workers if there is an excess 
supply of a particular skill in the home market.
39  Brücker, H. et al. (2003), “Potential Migration from Central and 
Eastern Europe into EU-15”, DIW, Berlin.21
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Table 6 Projection of young population aged 0-14
(in millions)
Total % change
2004 2020 2050 2004-20 2020-50 2004-2050
EU-25 74.8 69.6 60.4 -6.8 -13.3 -19.2
EU-15 62.4 59.6 52.7 -4.5 -11.5 -15.5
EU-10 12.4 10.4 8.6 -16.1 -17.0 -30.4
Source: European Commission (2005), European Economy, Special Report No 4/2005. 
increase in migrants in the form of daily 
commuters.
Finally, access to social security benefits in a 
host country may decrease the risks associated 
with labour migration for potential migrants, 
since it ensures that an unsuccessful search for 
employment does not result in zero income. 
This mechanism, in particular, was discussed 
prior to the 2004 enlargement of the EU, since 
there was strong concern in a number of EU-15 
countries that providing migrants with automatic 
access to social security benefits would increase 
the migrant flows from the EU-8. As Table 1 has 
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indicated, even the United Kingdom and Ireland 
have restricted migrants’ access to their social 
security systems.
In summary, analysis of the determinants of 
migration in this section suggests that wage and 
income differentials between the EU-10 and 
EU-15 exist and that the size of these 
differentials relative to the costs of migration 
may be an important determinant of labour 
migration flow in the short run. However, any 
increase in intra-EU mobility may not be 
uniformly spread across EU countries, with 
some countries more likely to host migrant 
workers (e.g. due to network effects and 
geographical location) and other countries more 
likely to be the source countries (e.g. due to 
high youth unemployment rates). Medium to 
long-term considerations suggest reduced 
labour migration incentives to residents of the 
EU-10, particularly as the EU-10 catch up 
economically to the EU-15 and as a result of 
the faster-projected population ageing of the 
EU-10 populations. 
6  RECENT NUMBERS ON INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR MOBILITY FOLLOWING EU 
ENLARGEMENT 
Although the May 2004 enlargement of the EU 
is still a recent event, some preliminary 
information on labour migration flows since 
this enlargement is available. In February 2006, 
the European Commission prepared a report for 
the European Council which evaluates the 
labour market impact of the 2003 transitional 
arrangements on the freedom of movement of 
persons (annexed to the Treaty of Accession of 
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2003).40 Although some information is not fully 
harmonised across countries, this report 
provides a valuable source of material on the 
magnitude and the composition of labour 
migration flows to date. 
The first important conclusion of the 
Commission report is that although there has 
been an increase in the stock of EU-10 workers 
in the EU-15 Member States since the 2004 
enlargement, the number of new work permits 
issued to EU-10 nationals as a proportion of the 
host country’s working age population has been 
low. Furthermore these numbers generally 
overstate the increase, since they do not take 
account of EU-10 workers who consequently 
return home, and include workers who might 
have already been resident in a country before 
enlargement. 
Figures in the European Commission (2006) 
report show that, in the first quarter of 2005, 
the number of EU-10 workers as a proportion of 
the working age population in the EU-15 was 
small, ranging between 0.1% in France and the 
Netherlands to 1.4% in Austria and 2% in 
Ireland. Table 7 presents the change in this 
share of EU-10 workers over the period 2003 to 
2005. Even the largest increases seem to have 
been moderate, ranging from between 0.1 p.p. 
per year in the United Kingdom to a 1.4 p.p. 
increase in Austria in 2005. For the EU-15 as a 
whole, the increase amounted to only 0.2 p.p. 
over the two-year period. The Commission 
notes that immigration from non-EU countries 
is generally a much more significant 
phenomenon than intra-EU mobility, both 
within the EU-15 and the EU-25. 
Other conclusions of the Commission (2006) 
report include no direct link between having 
temporary restrictions on labour migration 
from the EU-8 in place and the magnitude of 
Table 7 Resident working population by nationality, 2003 to 2005
(percentage of the total working age population)
Nationality
Foreign nationals from EU-15 Foreign nationals from EU-10
2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Belgium 5.4 5.8 5.8 0.2 0.2 0.2
Denmark 1.0 1.1 1.1 . . .
Germany 2.7 2.6 2.8 . . 0.7
Greece 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Spain 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
France 1.9 2.1 1.9 0.1 0.1 0.1
Ireland 3.4 3.3 3.0 . . 2.0
Luxembourg 37.2 37.6 37.6 0.3 0.3 0.3
Netherlands 1.5 1.5 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.1
Austria 1.7 1.8 1.9 0.7 0.8 1.4
Portugal 0.3 0.4 0.4 . . .
Finland 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
Sweden 2.2 2.2 2.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
UK 1.8 1.8 1.7 0.2 0.3 0.4
EU-15 2.0 2.1 2.1 0.2 0.2 0.4
EU-10 . 0.2 0.2 . 0.1 0.2
EU-25 1.9 1.7 1.7 0.1 0.1 0.3
Source: European Commission (2006), based on Eurostat Labour Force Survey, Q1 2003-2005, Ireland Q2 2005
Note: Missing data due to unreliable data or small sample sizes. Italy excluded, since it does not disaggregate by nationality. EU-15 
aggregate without Germany, Italy and Ireland for foreign nationals from EU-10.
40  European Commission (2006), “Report on the functioning of the 
Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty 
(period 1 May 2004 to 30 April 2006)”, Brussels.23
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the measured migration flows from these 
countries. It argues that labour flows are 
ultimately driven by demand and supply 
conditions, and that the temporary restrictions 
on mobility only delay labour market 
adjustments and distort employment patterns 
through increasing undeclared work. The report 
finds that most labour migration is of a 
temporary nature, with a significant percentage 
of work permits being granted for short-term or 
seasonal workers.41
In addition to these figures, data from individual 
EU countries are available, compiled by their 
national statistical offices. Particularly data 
from the three countries that have opened up 
their labour markets to immigrants from the 
EU-8 first (Ireland, Sweden, United Kingdom) 
may be the most relevant here. 
Table 8 Estimated total number of migrants to Ireland by nationality from 2000 to 2005
(thousands)
2000 2001 2002 2003* 2004* 2005*
UK 20.8 20.6 19.1 13.5 13 13.8
Rest of EU-15 11.7 10.3 11.3 9.7 12.6 8.9
EU-10 - - - - - 26.2
US   5.5   6.7   6.6   4.7   4.8   4.3
Rest of the world 14.5 21.5 29.9 22.5 19.7 16.8
Total 52.6 59.0 66.9 50.5 50.1 70
Source: Statistical office of Ireland, *preliminary, for the years 2000-2004 EU-10 nationals were included in the “Rest of the world” 
category.
Table 9 Total number of migrants to Sweden by country (flow)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Estonia 264 271 290 277 403 383
Latvia 150 157 161 152 206 232
Lithuania 146 213 259 230 438 695
Poland 649 809 1,065 1,017 2,458 3,420
Slovak Republic 61 48 68 47 105 97
Slovenia 11 21 12 16 34 36
Czech Republic 77 80 99 83 88 113
Hungary 146 167 222 159 228 269
EU-8 1,504 1,766 2,176 1,981 3,960 5,245
Source: Statistical office of Sweden.
First, for Ireland, annual data are available from 
the Central Statistical Office on the total 
number of migrants to Ireland per year. These 
data suggest no increase in total migration 
flows in 2004, but a substantial pick-up in the 
number of migrants to Ireland in 2005. Data 
show that in 2005, 38% of all migrants were 
nationals of the EU-10. However, no separate 
account for nationals from the EU-10 are 
available for 2004, making it difficult to assess 
whether the 2005 increase in migration flow is 
connected to an increase in migration flows 
from the new Member States as the result of 
enlargement, or some other reason.
41  For example, in Germany 95% of work permits issued were for 
limited time periods, in Italy and France this percentage was 
around 70% in 2004.
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In Sweden, the Statistical Office provides 
information on the total inflow of immigrants 
until 2005. These figures (see Table 9) show a 
strong increase of migrants entering Sweden 
(more than doubling since 2003) from the new 
Member States, but from a very low level, 
reaching a number of only around 5,000 people 
in 2005. 65% of the total migration flows from 
EU-8 came from Poland, the largest new 
Member State. 
It is noteworthy that, compared to the size of 
their population, the share of migration from 
Lithuania and Estonia appeared to be fairly 
high making up 13% and 7% respectively of the 
total migration flows from EU-8 to Sweden in 
2005. In both cases, geographical proximity 
may have played a role in decreasing the costs 
to migration.
In the United Kingdom, detailed information is 
available on work applications made by EU-8 
nationals living in the United Kingdom since 
EU enlargement (see Chart 3). Available 
registers are compiled by the UK Home Office 
and contain information on the number of 
applicants to the UK Workers Registration 
Scheme (WRS) – a scheme to which nationals 
of the EU-8 who intend to be employed in the 
United Kingdom are required to register. Details 
are published in the Accession Monitoring 
Report (2006).42 Data on applicants to the WRS 
is not a fully accurate measure of migration 
since numbers reflect the gross (cumulative) 
number of workers applying for the WRS. They 
do not therefore take account of any individuals 
leaving the United Kingdom following 
registration or employment and include EU-10 
nationals that were living in the United Kingdom 
prior to enlargement.
According to the latest Accession Monitoring 
Report, a total of 392,000 EU-8 citizens applied 
to the WRS between 1 May 2004 and 31 March 
2006. 61% of these applicants were Polish, 12% 
Lithuanian43, 10% Slovak and 5-6% were 
citizens of the Czech Republic and Latvia. Only 
a very small number of individuals from 
Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia applied, 
42  Accession Monitoring Report, May 2004-March 2006, (May 
2006), UK Home Office.
43  This is a particularly high number, relative to the size of the 
Lithuanian working age population. Perhaps correspondingly, 
the youth unemployment rate in Lithuania dropped by about 
7.5 p.p. over the same period.
accounting for 1%, 3% and less than 0.5% of 
the total applicants, respectively. The report 
estimates that a third of these applicants lived 
in the United Kingdom before EU 
enlargement. 
Regarding the allocation of the applicants by 
skill level and sector, the 2005 Accession 
Monitoring Report finds that individuals from 
the EU-8 have been filling gaps in the United 
Kingdom labour market, particularly in 
administration, business and management, 
hospitality and catering, agriculture, health 
care and construction. EU-8 nationals were 
assessed to be contributing positively to the 
functioning of public services in a number of 
communities across the United Kingdom. The 
vast majority of workers were young and single 
– 82% of the registered workers were between 
the ages of 18 and 34 and 94% of them had no 
dependants living in the United Kingdom. The 
number of EU-8 nationals applying for income-
related benefits, such as child benefit, tax 
credits and housing support, was found to be 
very low. While 98.4% of the National Insurance 
numbers to EU-8 citizens were allocated for 
employment purposes, only 0.7% were for 
Chart 3 Gross number of applicants from the 
EU-8 registering to the UK Workers’ Registration 
Scheme between 1 May 2004 and 31 March 2006
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benefits and 0.9% for tax credit purposes. Out 
of those applicants who applied in the period 
between May 2004 and March 2006, 49% were 
in temporary employment and 48% in permanent 
employment (3% did not provide information). 
The European Commission (2006) report also 
concludes that the countries that did not apply 
restrictions on EU-8 workers over the period 
May 2004 to 2006 (i.e. United Kingdom, Ireland 
and Sweden) have had favourable experiences 
about the labour market impact of migration 
from these countries since the 2004 
enlargement. 
7  THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF 
LABOUR MIGRATION
Most studies that have analysed migration flows 
following EU enlargement have focused on 
estimating the potential size of these flows. 
However, it is at least as important to look at the 
potential economic costs and benefits of labour 
migration – for the EU-15, and the EU-8, and 
for the EU-25 as a whole. Neoclassical economic 
theory suggests that migration is beneficial for 
everyone, when assuming a labour shortage in 
the host countries and excess labour in the 
sending countries. According to these theories, 
immigration eliminates the scarcity of labour in 
the host country, reduces possible inflationary 
pressure from wage growth in receiving 
countries and leads to a better use of productive 
capital. At the same time, the home country 
also benefits from a removal of unemployment 
and through the receipt of workers’ remittances; 
and migrants themselves benefit through higher 
wages.
But is the picture really as positive as suggested 
by neoclassical economics? Although these 
theories explain some basic channels of the 
impact of labour migration well, they may be 
too simplistic, being limited by a set of fixed 
assumptions, such as the homogeneity of 
migrants and perfect competition in labour 
markets. In real life, these assumptions do not 
often hold, and besides the benefits of labour 
migration, emphasised by neoclassical 
economists, there are also costs for both the 
host and home countries. The costs and benefits 
of labour migration depend on a number of 
factors, most of which are related to the labour 
market conditions of the home country and the 
composition of (the non- homogeneous) 
migrants by skills, age etc. Moreover, the costs 
and benefits tend to be distributed unevenly 
across various groups of society.
7.1  ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS: FOR THE 
HOST COUNTRIES (EU-15)
The positive view of neoclassical economics on 
migration seems to be in sharp contrast with the 
strong public resistance in a number of EU-15 
countries to migration from the EU-8. The 
major concerns of trade unions and the public 
in the EU-15 can be summarised in the following 
points:
1.  migrants drive down wages;
2. migrants take away jobs from the native 
population;
3.  migrants place a heavy strain on the social 
security systems of the host countries.
Concerning the wage effect of labour migration 
in Europe, a recent survey by IOM (2005)44 
argues that, in line with the prediction of 
neoclassical models, most empirical studies 
find a small negative effect of increased 
migration on wages which ranges between 
0.3 and 0.8 p.p. Although some recent studies, 
such as Dustmann et al. (2003)45 for the UK, 
find that wages among local workers are not 
affected by increased immigration.
Concerns over the possible negative employment 
effects of increased labour migration are found 
to hinge critically on whether immigrants 
complement or compete with the labour force 
44 International Organisation for Migration, (2005), “World 
Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of International 
Migration”.
45  Dustmann, C., F. Fabbri, I. Preston (2003), “The Local Labour 
Market Effects of Immigration in the UK”.
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of the host country. In the case of the EU-15, 
Boeri and Brücker (2001)46 show that the 
existence of skill mismatches, characterised by 
a pool of low-skilled unemployed and relatively 
high-skilled vacancies, suggest that the 
immigration of relatively skilled labour from 
the EU-8 might create employment. Studies 
conducted on Western European countries, 
surveyed by Brücker (2002) find the impact of 
migrants on employment to be weak and 
ambiguous.47 Similarly, another survey by 
Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) finds the overall 
employment effect of migration in the EU-15 to 
be positive and small, although unevenly spread 
across countries. An OECD study by O’Brien 
and Garson (2002)48 suggests that under the 
condition of largely competitive labour markets, 
labour migration reduces wages and increases 
employment in the host country, although for an 
adjustment period, unemployment may rise. If 
labour markets are less flexible in the host 
country, the effect on wages and employment is 
likely to be smaller and the unemployment 
effect for the adjustment period is likely to be 
larger and last longer.
The European Commission (2006)49 concludes 
that the sector and the skill composition of 
EU-10 citizens resident in EU-15 countries is 
such that migrants from these countries tend to 
play a complementary role in the EU-15 labour 
markets. For example, EU-10 migrants are 
made up of a much lower share of low-skilled 
workers (21%) and a higher share of medium-
skilled workers (57%) than EU-15 nationals 
(31% and 46% respectively – see Table 10). The 
Commission argues that medium-level 
qualifications include upper secondary 
education and specialised vocational training 
– which are typically under-represented in 
several EU-15 Member States, and may 
characterise a large proportion of workers in 
the EU-10. The shortage of medium-skilled 
workers in the EU-15 may therefore create skill 
bottlenecks in certain sectors of the economy 
and in turn a high demand for workers with 
these skills. Countries may have also followed 
selective recruitment strategies to target 
appropriately skilled immigrant groups. 
However, the broad sectoral composition of the 
national workforce did not show a significant 
change in 2003, 2004 and 2005. 
Early experiences following the 2004 
enlargement therefore suggest that migration of 
workers from the new EU-10 did not crowd out 
national workers and had a positive impact on 
the old EU-15 economies by alleviating labour 
market shortages in certain areas and supporting 
increased employment. 





Migrants from other 
EU-15 Member 
States





L o w 3 13 62 14 8
Medium 46 39 57 35
High 23 25 22 17
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: European Commission (2006), based on Eurostat Labour Force Survey, Q1 2005, France and Austria Q2 2005.
Note: Educational level: low (lower secondary), medium (upper secondary), high (tertiary).
46  T. Boeri and H. Brücker et al. (2001),“The impact of enlargement 
on employment and labour markets in the EU Member States”, 
CEPR, find that the migrant population from the new member states 
holds a higher share of completed secondary and tertiary education 
than the native population in the host countries of the EU-15.
47  H. Brücker (2002) The Employment impact of immigration a 
Survey of European Studies.
48    P. O’Brien, J.-P. Garson (2002), “The economic impact of 
international migration: a framework for EDRC country 
reviews”.
49  European Commission (2006), “Report on the functioning of the 
Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty 
(period 1 May 2004 to 30 April 2006)”, Brussels.27
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The studies mentioned above principally 
examine the overall impact of migration on 
aggregate employment and do not exclude the 
possibility of localised difficulties. If migrant 
workers concentrate in certain industries or 
geographical areas, they may decrease the job 
prospects of the local labour force. Such 
experiences have been seen in the German 
construction industry, where a large number of 
foreign workers have put pressure on the local 
labour market. The European Commission 
(2006) report finds that, for example, workers 
from the EU-10 are relatively better represented 
in the construction sector (15% for EU-10 
nationals as opposed to 8% for EU-15 country 
nationals). However it argues that new jobs are 
being created, e.g. in construction and domestic 
and catering services, that might not be filled 
in some countries, were it not for workers from 
the EU-10.
A further concern regarding immigration relates 
to the fear that migrants put a strain on the 
welfare system by relying more on welfare 
benefits than their contribution via taxes. These 
concerns led the United Kingdom and Ireland 
to limit access to their social security system 
following the recent EU enlargement. In the 
empirical economics literature, a critical issue 
is the extent of the dependence of immigrants 
on social security benefits. The study of Brücker 
(2002) suggests a fairly ambiguous picture. 
Indeed, for some Western European countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland), the welfare 
dependence of migrants appears to be higher 
than for the local population. At the same time, 
in a number of other Western European states 
(Germany, Greece, Portugal, Spain, United 
Kingdom), the migrants welfare dependence 
appears to be similar or even lower than for the 
local population. However, the European 
Commission (2006) report concludes that early 
experiences following the 2004 enlargement 
show that fears concerning the overuse of social 
security systems by migrants have not been 
realised. Generally, EU-10 nationals are found 
to have employment rates which are comparable 
or higher than EU-15 country nationals, and 
that the employment rate of EU-10 nationals 
has actually increased since the 2004 
enlargement in several countries (e.g. Spain, 
France, the Netherlands, Austria and the United 
Kingdom).50
Finally, labour migration may have negative 
externalities. These externalities are related to 
the difficulties of the local society to integrate 
a large number of migrants, especially where 
migrants have a very different cultural or 
religious background. However, these concerns 
are unlikely to be very relevant in the case of 
migrants from the EU-8.
Turning to the generally perceived potential 
benefits of labour migrants to the EU-15, these 
include possible positive effects on output. 
Most empirical studies (see the literature review 
of Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999) suggest a 
small positive impact of migration on real GDP 
growth, particularly in the case of skilled 
immigrants. Skilled migrants may also 
contribute positively to total factor productivity 
growth, although unlike in the United States, 
immigration into export-oriented, technology-
intensive industries has made up only a small 
part of the total migration flows in Europe. If 
the immigrant labour force is mainly 
complementing the native labour force, 
immigration can increase the productivity of 
natives and thereby positively influence their 
wages. Immigration may also facilitate domestic 
factor utilisation. For example, labour migration 
may help to compensate for low regional 
mobility by the local population.51 Finally, some 
hopes are attached to migration helping to 
counterbalance Europe’s demographic decline. 
A study by the UN52, however, concludes that 
the stabilisation of old age dependency ratios 
through migration alone is unlikely, due to the 
huge number of migrants that would be 
required.
50    This may reflect, for example, the legal employment of 
previously undeclared workers, benefits of legally sanctioned 
labour markets, improved social cohesion and changes in 
employer’s attitudes.
51  G. Borjas (2001), “Does migration grease the wheels of the 
labour market?”, Harvard University, mimeo.
52  UN, Human Development Report (2004).
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7.2  ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS: FOR THE 
HOME COUNTRIES (EU-8)
While the migration of young and skilled labour 
from the EU-8 is likely to bring significant 
positive effects for the EU-15, for the EU-8 
themselves, it may also present a number of 
risks, especially in the short run. Although the 
size of realised East-West labour migration 
seems very small in proportion to the population 
of the EU-15, this share is much higher when 
compared to the size of the EU-8 countries’ 
population.
First, the emigration of young and qualified 
labour can increase labour shortages in some 
sectors, hampering income convergence. 
Moreover, if large-scale emigration concentrates 
in specific industries or areas, it can aggravate 
labour market bottlenecks, and, at least in the 
short run, lead to a rise in wages and inflationary 
pressures. A recent study by Krieger et al.53 
suggests that this will be a relevant danger for 
the EU-8 that may loose up to 5% of their young 
adults and 10% of their graduates due to 
emigration. The loss of a sizable share of young 
people may aggravate the already negative 
population growth in the bulk of the EU-8, and 
may also result in the loss of public funds 
invested in the education of the young migrants. 
However, if migrants from the EU-8 return to 
their home countries with upgraded skills, this 
may offset the initial losses caused by the brain 
drain. Returning migrants can also give a boost 
to economic growth by using capital, skills and 
new ideas acquired abroad. The experiences of 
the Southern European countries suggest this to 
be a relevant factor. 
While the EU-8 are still mostly assumed to be 
sources of labour emigration, in 2005 the net 
migration balance of some of the Central 
European EU-8 (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovenia and Slovakia) was positive (see Table 
11). However, whether the “brain drain” or the 
“brain gain” effect will dominate in the EU-8 in 
the future strongly depends on the skills and the 
length of stay of migrants. An IOM survey54 
revealed that labour migration intentions are 
highest for very short stays and lowest for 
permanent migration. While 50% of Slovaks, 
Poles and Czechs expressed an intention to 
“emigrate” into the EU-15 for a few weeks, 
only 7% to 14% intended to settle down 
permanently.55
Emigration also benefits home countries with a 
high unemployment rate. Having job seekers 
work abroad may prevent the unemployed from 
Table 11 Net migration and its impact on total population change in the EU-8 in 2005
Net population change Net migration  Total population change
Per 1000 population
CZ -0.5  3.5  2.9
EE -2.5 -0.1 -2.8
HU -3.9  1.8 -2.1
LV -4.9 -0.5 -5.4
LT -4.0 -3.0 -7.0
PL -0.3 -0.3 -0.7
SK  0.2  0.8  0.9
SI -0.5  3.6  3.1
Sources: Eurostat, Chronos database.
53  H. Krieger et al. (2004), “Migration Trends in an Enlarged 
Europe”, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions.
54  Wallace, C. (1998) “Migration Potential in Central and Eastern 
Europe”, IOM – Technical Cooperation Centre for Europe and 
Central Asia.
55  In practice it is not so easy to differentiate ex ante between 
different intentions concerning migration, since intentions of 
short-term stay often turn into permanent migration.29
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losing their skills and decrease the burden on 
social security in the home countries. Labour 
migration can also work as a shock absorber in 
the case of asymmetric shocks. However, the 
generally low level of labour mobility within 
the EU-8 suggests that this role for migration 
has so far been limited. Moreover, a study by 
Fassmann and Hintermann (1997)56 argues that 
pull factors (labour market conditions, wages 
etc. in the host countries) are much more 
important in driving migration from East to 
West Europe than push factors (labour market 
conditions, wages etc. in the home countries). 
However, the European Commission (2006) 
report suggests that unemployment rates have 
fallen in nearly all EU-10 countries since the 
2004 enlargement. This seems to be particularly 
true of youth unemployment (measured by the 
unemployment rate of the under 25s), which 
fell by around 7.5% in Lithuania and 4% in 
Latvia between 2004 and 2005.
Workers’ remittances are also among the 
potential benefits of emigration to the EU-10. 
Evidence from a number of countries suggests 
that remittances played a significant role in the 
development of home countries (e.g. Italy, 
Portugal, Greece, Spain and more recently 
Turkey or Mexico57). Remittances can be 
sources of investment and consumption. In 
some countries, workers’ remittances count as 
a relevant financing item for the current account 
deficit and contribute to the foreign exchange 
reserves of the receiving country. It is also 
important that remittances tend to be less 
volatile and pro-cyclical than other sources of 
current account deficit financing. Unfortunately 
it is difficult to get a reliable picture about the 
size of these flows, because at least some part 
of these flows avoid the official channels of 
money transfer due to high transaction costs.58 
In general, workers’ remittances as a percentage 
of GDP are larger for lower income countries 
than for middle-income countries (such as the 
EU-8).
Finally one should not underestimate the gains 
of the migrants themselves who can enjoy 
higher income, and perhaps a better use of their 
skills, reaping the highest share of the benefits 
from labour migration.
7.3  ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS: FOR THE 
EU-25 AS A WHOLE
The free mobility of labour between East and 
West may improve economic efficiency by 
facilitating a more efficient allocation of labour 
across the single market and by helping the 
matching of unemployed skills with job 
vacancies. It may also offer an adjustment 
mechanism within EMU, where, in the absence 
of country specific monetary and exchange rate 
policies, a high degree of labour market 
flexibility and labour mobility is beneficial in 
promoting the ability of national labour markets 
to adjust in the face of economic fluctuations 
and asymmetric shocks. 
Although East-West labour migration within 
the EU could improve economic efficiency, it 
does not offer a solution to skill shortages and 
the fall in the share of youth in the EU-25 labour 
force. Due, among other factors, to the ageing 
trends in both the EU-15 and the EU-8, 
migration from the East to the West cannot 
provide a solution for the EU-25’s demographic 
challenge. Similarly, the East-West migration 
of skilled labour can only be beneficial for the 
EU-25 as a whole if skilled workers have larger 
positive externalities to working in the EU-15 
rather than in the EU-8. 
Migration would certainly present a loss for the 
EU-25 as a whole however if the most agile part 
of the labour force in the EU-8 move to 
traditional migration centres outside Europe. 
56  H. Fassmann and C. Hintermann (1997), “Migrationspotential 
Ostmitteleuropa. Struktur und Motivation”, Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, Vienna.
57    OECD (2005), Trends in International Migration, Annual 
Report, 2004 addition.
58  IMF data in World Bank study – R. Holzmann, R. Munz (2002), 
“Challenges and Opportunities of International Migration 
for the EU, Its Member States, Neighbouring Countries and 
Regions: A Policy Note” – indicates an annual remittance 
flow of USD 39 million for Hungary and USD 35 million 
for Lithuania. However these figures are only a fraction 
of the remittances to other countries such as Portugal 
(USD 3,224 million) or Spain (USD 3,958 million).





Occasional Paper No. 52
October 2006
Furthermore, it would also be a loss for Europe 
if the restrictions on labour mobility caused an 
increase in illegal immigration and work in the 
black market. 
8 CONCLUDING  REMARKS
The objective of the Paper was to consider the 
potential for increased cross-border labour 
mobility59, within an enlarged EU in the medium 
to long run and the costs and benefits of 
increased labour migration to both sending and 
receiving countries. A review of the experiences 
of previous EU enlargements suggests that the 
increase in geographical labour mobility 
following enlargement has been limited. 
Estimates from studies which have attempted to 
estimate the potential migration flow following 
the May 2004 EU enlargement indicate a 
potential migration flow of between 1% and 4% 
of the total population of the EU-10 within one 
to two decades. Barriers to international labour 
mobility may also influence the level of labour 
migration from the EU-10 to the EU-15. These 
include the existence of legal and administrative 
barriers, the limited portability of pension 
rights and problems with the international 
recognition of professional qualifications.
An analysis of the key economic determinants 
of international labour mobility within the EU 
suggests that the probability of labour migration 
is positively related to the size of any wage or 
income differentials. Both the absolute wage 
gap and the absolute gap in per capita income 
are found to be high between the EU-8 and the 
EU-15, which may be an important determinant 
of labour migration flow in the short run. 
Furthermore, any increase in intra-EU mobility 
following enlargement may not be uniformly 
spread across EU countries, with some countries 
more likely to host migrant workers (e.g. due to 
network effects and geographical location) and 
other countries more likely to be the source 
countries (e.g. due to high youth unemployment 
rates). However, medium to long-term 
considerations suggest reduced labour migration 
incentives – as the EU-8 catches up economically 
to the EU-15. Indeed, when a catching-up 
economy is successful in creating conditions 
for broad based economic growth and job 
creation, labour migration pressure is likely to 
taper off, even when large wage differentials 
persist. Furthermore, the faster-projected 
population ageing of the EU-8 populations also 
imply a decrease in labour outflows from these 
countries. Against this background of strong 
growth and demographic change, most EU-8 
countries are likely to become net migration-
receiving countries in the medium run and face 
the challenge of attracting and integrating a 
large number of young migrants from third 
countries. 
Early labour market experiences following the 
2004 enlargement are generally positive. 
Preliminary evidence from the European 
Commission shows that the increase in the 
stock of EU-10 workers in the EU-15 Member 
States since enlargement has been low. In fact, 
immigration from non-EU countries is generally 
a much more significant phenomenon than 
intra-EU mobility, both within the EU-15 and 
the EU-25. Most labour migration is found to 
be of a temporary nature, with a significant 
percentage of work permits being granted for 
short-term or seasonal workers. Furthermore, 
both the sector and the skill composition of the 
EU-10 citizens resident in EU-15 countries 
suggest that migrants from the EU-10 tend to 
play a complementary role in the EU-15 labour 
markets. Fears concerning the overuse of social 
security systems by migrants have not been 
realised. Generally, EU-10 nationals are found 
to have employment rates which are comparable 
or higher than EU-15 country nationals and that 
the employment rate of EU-10 nationals has 
actually increased since the 2004 enlargement 
in several countries (e.g. Spain, France, the 
Netherlands, Austria and the United Kingdom). 
Data from selected individual EU countries 
also generally show moderate increases in 
labour migration from the EU-10. The countries 
that have not applied restrictions on EU-8 
59   Here we refer to the cross-border mobility of workers, not 
including the self-employed. 31
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workers since the 2004 enlargement (i.e. United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden) are upbeat 
regarding their experiences about the labour 
market impact of labour migration from these 
countries. 
On the potential economic costs and benefits of 
migration both for host and home countries, the 
Public’s resistance to labour migration in a 
number of countries is based on concerns that 
migrants may drive down wages, take away jobs 
from the native population and place a strain on 
the social security systems of these countries. 
Our survey of the empirical literature finds 
limited evidence in support of these concerns 
and suggests that, on balance, for the host 
countries (the EU-15), the economic impacts of 
increased cross-border labour mobility are 
likely to be positive, although potentially 
unequally distributed across countries and 
sectors. Countries closest to the EU-8 and those 
with a significant migrant population from the 
EU-8, are likely to benefit disproportionately 
from East-West labour mobility, following the 
opening of their labour markets. However, this 
does not exclude the possibility of localised 
difficulties (e.g. in border regions with intensive 
commuting). 
For the EU-8 countries, an issue largely 
forgotten in the public debate is that labour 
migration, especially in the short run, may 
present a number of challenges as well as 
benefits. While labour migration flows are 
likely to be minor compared to the population 
of the EU-15, they can weigh far heavier on the 
pool of young and educated workers in the 
EU-8. Labour shortages (e.g. in medical 
personal) are already causing concerns in a 
number of EU-8 countries. The balance of 
positive and negative effects of increased cross-
border mobility mainly depends on whether 
labour migration is primarily temporary or 
permanent. Returning migrants may give a 
boost to economic growth by bringing in capital, 
skills and new ideas acquired abroad, which 
may offset the initial losses caused by the brain 
drain. Increased labour migration is also most 
likely to be beneficial for the migrants 
themselves who may enjoy higher incomes.
For the EU as a whole, cross-border labour 
mobility is likely to offer a number of advantages 
through allowing a more efficient matching of 
worker skills with job vacancies and facilitating 
the general up-skilling of European workforces. 
It may also offer an important adjustment 
mechanism within EMU, where, in the absence 
of country-specific monetary and exchange rate 
policies, labour market mobility would be 
beneficial in promoting the ability of national 
labour markets to adjust in the face of economic 
fluctuations and asymmetric shocks.60 The euro 
area will enlarge on 1 January 2007 with the 
entry of Slovenia. In order to fully reap the 
advantages of the euro and to allow adjustment 
mechanisms to operate efficiently within the 
enlarged currency area, it will be necessary to 
fully integrate Slovenia into Economic and 
Monetary Union, which calls for all remaining 
barriers to labour mobility to be removed61.
The restrictions on labour mobility from the 
EU-8 countries will be temporary, as they will 
have to be removed by 2011 at the latest. 
However the delay may be costly for the EU-25, 
limiting the most productive use of labour 
resources at a time when EU populations are 
ageing and leaders are concerned about Europe’s 
international competitiveness. Furthermore, the 
temporary restrictions on cross-border mobility 
stand in contrast with one of the central 
principles of the EU – the free movement of 
labour. Today’s East-West labour migration 
flows include a large number of temporary 
workers, some of which work illegally. Such 
employment relationships deprive immigrants 
from the protection of employment laws and 
prevent the host country from collecting tax 
revenues. Furthermore, it will be a certain loss 
60  Geographic mobility in the United States has also been found to 
offer an important adjustment mechanism (HM Treasury, United 
Kingdom, 2002) allowing employment to adjust following 
economic shocks (Blanchard and Katz 1992, Bayoumi and 
Prasad 1996).
61 See Introductory Statement of the Mr. Trichet following the 
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for EU-25 if a significant part of the most agile 
and talented individuals from the new Member 
States are diverted to traditional migration 
centres (e.g. United States, Canada) instead of 
taking on employment in other EU Member 
States. 33
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